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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly determine the rights 
of participants in agricultural cooperatives which merge as those 
rights are set forth in Section 3-1-30 et seq. UCA. 
2. Did the Court of Appeals in affirming a judgment of 
dismissal based upon laches: 
(a) err in that the facts relative to delay were materially 
disputed and show genuine issues of fact; and, 
(b) err in that the Defendant IMPA had formally abandoned the 
merger? 
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DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals was rendered in Case 
No. 890289-CA. The Opinion was not published. A copy thereof is 
included as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
1. Date of Entry: The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
was entered on December 11, 1989. 
2. Order re Extension of Time: An Ex Parte Motion for 
Extension of Time to File a Petition for Writ of Certiorari was 
filed on January 10, 1990, and an order granting a twenty day 
extension was entered on January 10, 1990. 
3. Jurisdiction: Rule 43(3) (4) R. Utah S. Ct. provides 
statutory authority to this Court to review the decision in 
question. 
RELEVANT LAW 
1. Rule 56, (c)(d)(e) U.R.C.P.: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
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interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If 
on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case of for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the 
court at the hearing of motion, by examining 
the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable 
ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material 
facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief 
is not in controversy, and directing such 
further proceedings in the action as are just. 
Upon the trial of the action the facts so 
specified shall be deemed established, and the 
trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; 
Defense Required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge 
shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissable in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn 
or certified copies of all papers or parts 
thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be 
attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented 
or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When 
a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If 
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate shall be entered against him. 
2. Title 3, U.C.A. 1953 Text is set forth in its entirety 
at Appendix C. 
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3. Section 3-1-32: 
Merger - Contents and approval of plan of 
merger. 
The board of directors, board of trustees of 
other governing board by whatever name 
designated, of each party to the merger shall, 
by resolution adopted by each such board, 
approve a plan of merger setting forth: 
(1) the name of the associations and 
corporations proposing to merge, which are 
sometimes designate*! in this act collectively 
as parties to the merger and singly as a party 
to the merger, and the name of the association 
or corporation into which they propose to 
merge, which is designated in this act as the 
surviving corporation; 
(2) the terms and conditions of the proposed 
merger; 
(3) the manner and basis of converting the 
stock of shares, if any, of each party to the 
merger, into stock, shares or other securities 
or obligations of the surviving corporation; 
(4) the manner and basis of converting 
membership interests, if any, of each party to 
the merger into membership interests, stock, 
shares or other securities or obligations of 
the surviving corporation; 
(5) the manner and basis of converting any 
certificates of interest, patronage refund 
certificates of other interest as members, 
patrons or otherwise by whatever name 
designated in any fund, capital investment, 
savings or reserve of each party to the merger 
into stock, shares or other securities or 
obligations of or certificates of interest, 
patronage refund certificates, or other 
interests in any fund, capital investment, 
savings or reserve of the surviving 
corporation, including any changes to be made 
in the time and manner of payment of any such 
certificates or interests; 
(6) a statement electing whether the 
surviving corporation shall be governed by the 
Uniform Agricultural Cooperative Association 
Act or by the Utah Nonprofit Corporation and 
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Cooperative Association Act. The surviving 
corporation shall not be governed by the Utah 
Business Corporation Act; 
(7) a statement of any changes in the 
articles of incorporation of the surviving 
corporation to be effected by such merger, 
including such changes required by the law 
under which the surviving corporation is to be 
governed; and 
(8) such other provisions with respect to the 
proposed merger as are deemed necessary or 
desirable. 
Section 3-1-33 (second paragraph): 
For the purposes of this act, persons holding 
certificates of interests, patronage refund 
certificates or other interest by whatever 
name designated as members, patrons or 
otherwise in any fund, capital investment, 
savings or reserve of any party to the merger 
shall not be considered members, shareholders 
or stockholders if the aggregate of such 
holdings have a stated or face value of less 
than $50, unless designated a member, 
shareholder or stockholder by the articles of 
incorporation of the association or 
corporation in which they have holdings; but, 
if the aggregate of such holdings have a 
stated face value of $50 or more, such persons 
shall be considered members even though not 
otherwise designated a member or shareholder 
or stockholder by the articles of 
incorporation or bylaws of the association or 
corporation in which they have such holding 
and shall be entitled to all rights of members 
under this act. 
Section 3-1-35 (second paragraph): 
After such approval by a vote of the members 
and shareholders of each party to the merger 
and at any time prior to the filing of the 
articles of merger, the merger may be 
abandoned pursuant to provisions therefor, if 
any, set forth in the plan of merger. 
Section 3-1-39: 
Merger - Dissent from plan by member or 
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shareholder - Dissent as to less than cill of 
memberships or shares. 
Any member or shareholder of a domestic 
association or corporation shall have the 
right to dissent from any plan of merger to 
which the association or corporation is a 
party in accordance with the procedure and at 
the times set forth in this act. A member or 
shareholder may dissent as to less than all of 
the memberships of shares registered in his 
name and, in that event, his rights shall be 
determined as if the membership or shares as 
to which he has dissented and his other 
memberships or shares were registered in the 
names of different members of shareholders. 
7. Section 3-1-40 (first paragraph): 
Merger - Dissent from plan by member of 
shareholder - Filing objection to plan -
Demand for payment for membership or shares 
and procedure for payment. 
Any member or shareholder electing to exercise 
such right of dissent shall file with the 
association or corporation, prior to or at the 
meeting at which the plan of merger is 
submitted to a vote, a written objection to he 
plan of merger. If the plan of merger be 
approved by the required vote and if, but only 
if, such member of shareholder shall not have 
voted in favor thereof, such member or 
shareholder may, within ten days after the 
date on which vote was taken, make written 
demand on the surviving corporation for 
payment of the fair value of the interest of 
such member or for payment of the fair value 
of such shareholder's shares, as the case may 
be, and, if the merger is effected, such 
corporation shall pay to such member or 
shareholder, upon surrender of any certificate 
or certificates representing such membership 
or such shares, the fair value thereof as of 
the day prior to the date on which the vote 
was taken approving the plan of merger, 
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in 
anticipation of such merger. Any member or 
shareholder failing to make such written 
objection prior to or at such meeting and 
failing to make such demand within the ten-
day period shall be bound by the terms of the 
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plan of merger. Any member or shareholder 
making such objection and demand shall 
thereafter be entitled only to payment as in 
this section provided and shall not be 
entitled to vote or to exercise any other 
rights of a member or shareholder• 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns the procedures used in 1985-86 to combine 
corporate agricultural cooperatives, Cache Valley Dairy Association 
(CVDA) and Intermountain Milk Producers' Association (IMPA). 
The Plaintiffs are directors, members and holders of 
certificates of interest in CVDA. They sought certification as 
representatives of a class of all members and certificate holders. 
Plaintiffs also sought to act derivatively for CVDA. The 
Defendants are the two cooperatives, other directors of CVDA and 
legal counsel. 
The issues were joined upon presentation of motions for 
partial summary judgment, Defendants' motion to dismiss and 
Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Significant facts were 
undisputed. The trial court rendered a Memorandum Decision 
generally determining the legal issues in favor of the Defendants. 
Memorandum decision, Appendix B. Pursuant thereto, Plaintiffs' 
Complaint was ordered dismissed and class certification was denied. 
Id. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial 
court's decision in part, reversing it in part and remanding for 
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further proceedings. The Court of Appeals found that the 
Defendants had failed to follow the requirements of Title 3 
relative to merger. It then assumed for purposes of analysis that 
the statutory requirements were mandatory. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed in part because it found the Defendants were barred by 
laches. It reversed in part as to the causes of action alleging 
negligence because of insufficient findings and remanded for 
further proceedings. Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Appendix 
A. 
The Plaintiffs have filed for a writ of certiorari to this 
Court for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action challenges the method and legal basis used to 
combine Cache Valley Dairy Associaiton (CVDA) with Intermountain 
Milk Producers Association (IMPA), another corporate agricultural 
cooperative. Named as Defendants in the action were CVDA, IMPA, 
other directors of CVDA and legal counsel along with various John 
Does. 
The Complaint alleged that the combination of CVDA and IMPA 
was required to follow the statutory procedures set forth in 
Section 3-1-30 et seq. Further that the statutory requirements 
were mandatory not permissive or alternative to other procedures. 
Verified Complaint, T.R. at 1-26, Appendix G. Further that 
Defendants wholly failed to follow the statutory procedures 
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requisite to a valid combination. .Id.. The Complaint seeks money 
damages on behalf of Plaintiffs and on behalf of CVDA or 
alternatively, equitable relief. 
Defendants admitted that the statutory procedures of Section 
3-1-30 et seq. were not followed. T.R. at 197-198. Defendants 
urged that the combination of the two cooperatives was by 
consolidation or transfer of all assets, therefore the procedures 
of Section 3-1-30 were not required. T.R. at 199-200. 
Plaintiffs countered that the Notice sent to all members 
specifically stated that the combination was to be pursuant to 
Section 3-1-30 et seq.: 
The Board of Directors of Cache Valley Dairy 
Association has adopted a Resolution directing 
that a Plan of Merger (Consolidation) under 
Section 3-1-30 et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, 
be submitted to a vote of the members of Cache 
Valley Dairy Association at a special meeting 
of members to be held at 10:30 o'clock a.m. on 
Monday, December 16, 1985, at the Smithfield 
Armory, 10 East Center Street, Smithfield, 
Utah. 
T.R. at 26, Appendix D. The Board of Directors of CVDA never 
approved any other form or type of combination. Indeed there were 
no Board meetings from December 16, 1985 to December of 1986. T.R. 
at 380. 
The Plaintiffs stated their claims individually, derivatively 
and as a class alleging that there was no valid transfer of assets 
to IMPA. The acts of the Defendants were also alleged to be 
negligent and cause for recision of liens or encumbrances on CVDA 
property. Verified Complaint, T.R. at 126, Appendix Document G. 
The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging 
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inconsistent causes of action because the complaint requested both 
direct and derivative relief in addition to money damages and 
recision. T.R. at 91. Plaintiffs responded to that motion. T.R. 
at 117, Apparently, the trial court's final order is not based 
upon this motion or the grounds stated therein. 
The Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
the central issue alleging that Defendants were required to follow 
the statutory procedures set out in Section 3-1-30 et seq. T.R. at 
48. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs urged that the Defendants were 
estopped from using any other procedure because of the language of 
the Notice sent. JEd. Alternatively, Defendants had to follow 
either the corporate procedures for merger, consolidation or 
transfer of all assets or the common law. Ici. The Defendants 
responded to Plaintiffs' motion with a cross motion for summary 
judgment alleging there is no statutory procedure required other 
than Board approval. T.R. at 247. 
The trial court entered a brief and somewhat confusing 
memorandum decision addressing all the motions collectively. T.R. 
at 55 2; Appendix B. The decision found Defendants had failed to 
follow the statutory procedures for merger of agricultural 
cooperatives. Further that the Notice was defective if a merger 
or consolidation of agricultural cooperatives was contemplated. 
However, the trial court found that the statutory procedures were 
not an exclusive alternative for combination of agricultural 
cooperatives. Ld. The trial court found that a transfer of assets 
had occurred and that procedure was not covered by the statute. 
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The trial court stated that Plaintiffs might claim money damages 
but had not asked for them. The trial court found the remedies of 
recision and restitution would not be allowed because of laches. 
Based upon these rulings the court proposed to dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint without prejudice to filing a request for money damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There was no evidentiary hearing held in this matter. The 
trial court failed to provide a record of what it determined 
material and undisputed, however, in significant part the facts 
were undisputed. 
Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment included a 
statement of relevant facts broken into twelve separate statements 
with specific reference to the Verified Complaint as support for 
the same. Defendants responded to that statement by admitting or 
clarifying each such statement. In the absence of a better record 
by the trial court the combination of this interchange provides 
the Court with the undisputed facts. T.R. at 52-54, 197-199, 
Appendix H. 
Subsequently, Defendant tendered a document they labeled as 
being "Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts" numbering the 
same in Paragraphs 1 through 39. T.R. at 140-151. Plaintiffs 
responded admitting, denying and/or clarifying the same with 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits. This provided some additional facts on 
which the trial court could base its decision. T.R. at 227-238. 
The Defendants' Statement and Plaintiffs' Response with the 
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interchange as to each fact is included in its entirety. Appendix 
Subsequently, on June 29, 1987, the trial court rendered a 
memorandum decision. T.R. at 552. The Defendants tendered a 
proposed order to the court to which Plaintiffs duly objected. 
T.R. at 555. The basis of the objection was the failure to provide 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or clarification regarding 
the general findings, legal conclusions and denial of class 
certification. Over Defendants' objections the court entered the 
order as presented. T.R. at 586; Appendix B. 
It is from that Order that the Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
summarizes its view of the decision of the trial court as follows: 
With this in mind, we first consider whether, on the 
undisputed facts before it, the trial court correctly 
determined that respondents were entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law on appellants' first, second, and fifth 
causes of action for rescission because of laches. See, 
e.g., D&L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
For purposes of analysis, we will assume that the 
merger provisions found in Sections 3-1-30 to -41 applied 
to the transaction by which CVDA's operations, assets, 
and liabilities were taken over by IMPA, even though 
respondents characterize the transaction as something 
other than a merger. We interpret sections 3-1-30 to -
41 as creating individual rights in the members of an 
agricultural cooperative to enforce the* mandated 
procedures and member vote requirements for accomplishing 
a merger. 
Opinion at 9 (footnotes omitted) Appendix A. The Court of Appeals, 
having interpreted the trial court's decision in this manner, 
proceeded to find the Plaintiffs' claims barred by laches. 
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ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT 
First Question Presented: DID THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY 
DETERMINE THE RIGHTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
WHICH MERGE AS THOSE RIGHTS ARE SET FORTH IN SECTION 3-1-30 ET 
SEQ., UCA? 
There are numerous agricultural cooperative associations in 
the State of Utah. Most of the agricultural producers of this 
State are members of one or more agricultural cooperatives. The 
State of Utah recognizes agricultural cooperatives as a distinct 
and different type of legal entity providing a specific statutory 
framework within which they operate. Title 3, UCA 1953. 
A significant part of Title 3 governs the method in which 
those specialized entities are to merge or combine. There are 
specific and detailed procedures governing who is a member for 
purposes of voting for or dissenting from a merger. See Section 
3-1-33 (second paragraph). The method of voting and the use of 
proxies is controlled. Id. at Sections 34 and 35. The procedure 
for filing articles of merger is described. Id. at Section 36. 
Members who dissent to the merger are given the right to have fair 
value paid to them. Id. at Section 37. 
In this case an agricultural cooperative association combined 
with another but denies that it is subject to the regulatory 
procedure or any other corporate regulatory procedure whatsoever. 
All this despite an actual written notice given that it would 
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follow the procedures set forth in Section 3-1-30 et seq. Notice, 
Appendix D. This cooperative now states openly, and the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals so found, that it followed none of 
the statutory procedures and further that it is not required to. 
See Decision at 2, Appendix B: Opinion at 5 Appendix A. 
The trial court expressly confirmed the position of the 
Defendants herein, finding that an agricultural cooperative even 
with this Notice is not required to follow the statutory procedure. 
The cooperative could transfer all of its assets but then the 
members might have an action for damages. Id. 
The trial court's ruling is clear in one respect and very 
confusing in another. Clearly the trial court found that the 
statutory procedure was not required. However, it is confusing in 
that it suggests there is a possible claim for damages on behalf 
of members and producers because of a transfer of assets. It then 
states that no such claim was made. The Complaint makes that 
request for money damages at paragraphs 36-40. Appendix G. 
Only in considering the equitable remedies of rescission and 
restitution does the trial court make any reference to laches. 
Laches does not form a basis of the trial court's decision to 
dismiss. Instead the trial court is indicating that by reason of 
laches certain remedies will not be considered. The trial court 
is dismissing because it finds the combination is not improper as 
the statutory procedure is not required. 
The Court of Appeals, mischaracterizes the decision of the 
trial court as being a judgment against Plaintiffs based upon the 
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affirmative defense of laches as proven by undisputed facts. 
Opinion at 9 Appendix A. Evidently the Court of Appeals does 
disagree with the trial court, finding that these statutes do give 
individual members rights "to enforce the mandated procedures and 
member vote requirements". Id. at 9. 
The Court of Appeals proceeds to affirm in part the trial 
court by relying on laches. A careful reading of the trial court's 
decision indicates that the trial judge did not find that laches 
barred these causes of action only that it barred some forms of 
relief, i.e. rescission and restitution. He expressly found that 
the Plaintiffs could amend their complaint to seek damages. The 
trial judge erred because Plaintiffs were seeking money damages 
but his reasoning about laches is sound. Certainly a court of 
equity can restrict forms of relief because of the presence of 
laches. The Court of Appeals has expanded the trial judge's ruling 
about forms of relief into being dispositive of the case. 
As the record now sits it is unclear whether agricultural 
cooperative associations are required to comply with Sections 3-
1-30 et seq. Even in this very case there has been no ruling on 
that central issue yet the case is being remanded for further 
proceedings. The large number of agricultural cooperatives and 
their members are left in a state of confusion. Indeed if Sections 
3-1-30 et seq. can be disregarded, can other Sections of Title 3 
be disregarded as well. This is an important question of state law 
"which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court." Rule 
43R. Utah S. Ct. 
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An important question regarding corporate democracy within 
multi million dollar cooperatives is unsettled. State law is being 
either disregarded or is not applicable. Twice during the pendency 
of this case the litigants and others have lobbied the legislature 
to clarify state law on this issue. It is suggested that the state 
legislature does not want to consider remedial legislation until 
the application of present law is clarified. 
Second Question Presented: DID THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING 
A JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL UPON LACHES: 
(a) ERR IN THAT THE FACTS RELATIVE TO DELAY AND REASONS FOR 
DELAY WERE MATERIALLY DISPUTED AND SHOW GENUINE ISSUES 
OF FACT; AND, 
(b) ERR IN THAT THE DEFENDANT IMPA HAD FORMALLY ABANDONED THE 
MERGER; 
The Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court in 
part is based upon its finding of laches. Because of a motion to 
dismiss, Defendants were never required to file an answer to 
Plaintiff's Complaint and plead laches as an affirmative defense. 
The trial court's only ruling as to laches was that the 
interposition of other parties would foreclose the equitable 
remedies of rescission and restitution. Decision at 2: Appendix 
J3. The Court of Appeals, however, based its partial affirmation 
upon its findings of laches so as to justify a partial summary 
judgment as to the First, Second and Fifth Causes of Action. It 
finds the facts are undisputed as to this affirmative defense. In 
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so doing the Court of Appeals itself must and has become the fact 
finder adjudicating disputed facts, assessing knowledge and 
interpreting various events. The trial court never made these 
findings and the factual basis generated for this ruling is 
entirely new. In so doing the Court of Appeals makes numerous 
errors. 
(a) The very facts relied upon by the Court of Appeals are 
contested: 
The Plaintiffs by Verified Complaint stated that no plan of 
merger or Articles of Merger were ever approved by the Board of 
CVDA. Verified Complaint at 5 and 6; Appendix G. Plaintiffs also 
verified that they relied upon the advice of legal counsel 
believing and being told that they were properly following the 
statutory merger procedures. Id. at 13; See also, Defendants 
Interchange of Facts at 12; Appendix I. The Court of Appeals 
assumes that the Letter of Intent initiated a merger. Opinion at 
12; Appendix A. Plaintiffs responded to this allegation in the 
trial court reciting the language of this Letter of Intent and 
adding sworn statements. See Letter of Intent Paragraphs 6, 21, 
Appendix E; Defendants' Interchanges of Facts 7-11, Appendix I. 
All of the allegations regarding the intermingling of CVDA and IMPA 
and the possibility of separation were squarely contested with 
sworn affidavits. See Interchange of Facts 13, 17-39; Appendix I. 
(b) IMPA itself formally abondoned the merger: 
On December 17, 1985 the Board of IMPA passed a written 
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resolution which stated the merger was abandoned and a combination 
would be done in a different way. IMPA Resolution of 12/17/85? 
Appendix F. There is no evidence this abandonment was ever 
communicated to Plaintiffs in any way. The alternate procedure is 
completely without CVDA board involvement. The mechanics and the 
content of the transfer was designed by IMPA and Mr. Wilson. The 
argument is made that it is equivalent to what was approved. 
Unfortunately discovery never progressed to the point where the 
written Plan of Merger referred to in the Notice was discovered. 
This written Plan itself was never reviewed nor approved by the 
CVDA board despite reference to it in the Notice. Notice, See 
Appendix D. The only content as to what the terms of merger are 
is contained in the Summary of Merger attached to the Notice. That 
description is vague and concludes by simply saying and "all other 
provisions of the Agreement of Merger." Summary of Merger, 
paragraph 2, Appendix D. The fact is that since IMPA voided or 
abandoned the merger, an alternative method was chosen and the only 
terms of merger are what is what is said in the IMPA minutes. 
There is no evidence that any of the Plaintiffs were informed 
of this Resolution until after this litigation began. Assets were 
transferred, some in February and some in August of 1986. 
Plaintiffs thought and were told a statutory merger was approved. 
The Court of Appeals assumes and finds knowledgeable participation 
by the Plaintiffs when their sworn affidavits allege that they were 
not knowledgeable participants. They were misled by the IMPA 
attorney. Material information was withheld from them. 
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The transfer of assets was completed in August of 1986. After 
various efforts to resolve the problem by other means the 
Plaintiffs filed this suit in February of 1987, They acted within 
a few months which is reasonable under the circumstances. The 
Court of Appeals errs by entering the role of fact finder and 
adjudicator. 
This activity by the Court of Appeals departs from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. If it needed 
findings of fact relative to laches, the proper course would have 
been to remand to the trial court to make such adjudications. This 
activity compounds the error of the trial court. All of this goes 
back to the trial court's refusal to enter proper findings and 
conclusions. The Court of Appeals and this Court must require 
trial courts to describe and support their rulings. The Court of 
Appeals should not arrogate that role to itself. This Court by 
granting a Writ of Certiorari will allow the Plaintiffs to fully 
brief that erroneous pattern herein and correct an injustice done 
in the immediate case. It will also allow the Court to reaffirm 
the need for proper adudication and documentation of factual 
findings. 
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs request this Court to grant a Writ of 
Certiorari. 
DATED this day of January, 1990. 
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BARRETT & DAINES 
N. George Daines 
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